Rethinking Plato’s Forms by Alican, Necip Fikri & Thesleff, Holger

ARCTOS
ActA PhilologicA FennicA
VOL. XLVII
HELSINKI 2013
INDEX
11
49
97
111
131
153
173
199
219
243
257
265
301
393
Neci̇p Fi̇kri̇ Ali̇cAN –  Rethinking Plato's Forms
Holger THesleFF
ANN BrysBAerT Set in Stone? Socio-Economic Reflections on Human and 
Ani mal Resources in Monumental Architecture of Late 
Bronze Age Tiryns in the Argos Plain, Greece
guAlTiero cAlBoli A propos de l'ode d'Horace 4,9, en défence de Marcus 
Lollius. Quelques observations
ulrike eHmig Risikobewältigung bei Schwangerschaft und Geburt in 
der römischen Antike: lateinische dokumentarische und 
archäologische Zeugnisse
rudolF HAeNscH Von Poppaea zu Pulcheria – Das Bemühen um göttlichen 
Beistand bei der Geburt eines kaiserlichen Nachfolgers
kAi JuNTuNeN The Arrogant Armenian – Tiridates (Bagratuni) in Cassius 
Dio and Movses Khorenats'i
NikolAos kälviäiNeN Levels of Style in Byzantine Greek and the Role of Syntactic 
Complexity: A Quantitative Analysis of the Sentence 
Structure of Three Early Byzantine Hagiographic Texts
ANToNio pisTellATo Gaius Caesar, or the Ideal Non-princeps: A Tiberian Issue
Ari sAAsTAmoiNeN Physical and Visual Characteristics of Latin Building 
Inscriptions. The Case of North Africa
eliNA m. sAlmiNeN – Myrrhine's Ball Revisited
mikA kAJAvA
olli sAlomies A Note on the Speeches of the Prosecutors in Cicero's pro 
Milone 35–6
Heikki soliN Analecta epigraphica CCLXXXV– CCXCI
De novis libris iudicia
Index librorum in hoc volumine recensorum
Libri nobis missi
Index scriptorum
399
403
Arctos 47 (2013) 11–47
RETHINKING PLATO'S FORMS
necİP Fİkrİ AlİcAn – Holger THesleFF
Abstract
This is a proposal for rethinking the main lines of Plato's philosophy, including 
some of the conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Drawing on 
a new interpretive paradigm for Plato's overall vision, the central focus is on the 
so-called Forms. Regarding the guiding paradigm, we propose replacing the dual-
ism of a world of Forms separated from a world of particulars, with the monistic 
model of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of 
reality. Regarding the tools of the trade, we distinguish between three constructs 
that have come, one and all, and largely indiscriminately, to be regarded as Forms: 
Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. This recalibration of what 
we know of Plato's outlook, tools, and methods, together with a realignment of 
these with his general aims, will also help restore the philosopher's emphasis on 
that which is good, a perspective often blurred in the structure of two worlds.
1. Introduction
A common denominator in the history of Plato interpretation is the metaphysi-
cal dualism of Forms versus particulars.1 To be sure, other issues have also been 
in the forefront. But the point is that, for better or worse, Forms have been the 
centre of attention, and Plato has often been defined by them. Unfortunately, the 
converse does not hold: Plato has not, to put it crudely, defined the Forms. Thus, 
getting it right is both important and difficult.2
1  We are indebted to Debra Nails, Gerald A. Press, Pauliina Remes, and Christopher J. Rowe 
for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2  The literature on the Forms is vast. The following is a sampling: Alican (2012, 87–110); 
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We are convinced that the textbook interpretation of the Forms as uniform 
entities occupying a world outside our own is wrong in two respects, first, in pos-
iting an extra world to make things work, second, in compressing all abstractions, 
or, at any rate, too many of them, into the concept of Form. The first problem is 
ontological extravagance, the second, the exact opposite.
While we realise that the tradition we are opposing is not a united front 
dominating the field in unanimous agreement, we are also certain that we are not 
chasing phantoms. There is surely a familiar enough ring to the two-world dichot-
omy between Forms and particulars to justify our taking this to be the traditional 
account. And we feel safe in including under this rubric the fungibility of Forms 
as a group of homogeneous abstractions, which should also have a familiar ring, 
though, this one, perhaps not so loud, because it is usually a silent assumption as 
opposed to a declaration or argument. We trust that our meaning is clear enough 
in both cases without having to compile a list of textbooks that corroborate our 
impression of what counts as traditional in Plato scholarship. The designation 
'textbook interpretation', then, is a figure of speech that does not really call for 
documentation unless the account attached to it is alarmingly at odds with what 
one might expect to find in an actual textbook.3
Allen (1970); Blackson (1995); Dancy (2004); Fine (1993, 2003); Gerson (2004); McCabe 
(1994, 53–94); Patterson (1985); Ross (1951); Silverman (2002); Thesleff (1999, 50–107 
[= 2009, 434–88]). Studies focusing on problem areas might best be kept separate: Malcolm 
(1991); Meinwald (1991, 1992); Nails (2013); Pelletier (1990); Rickless (2007); Rowe (2005); 
Sayre (1983, 1996); Scolnicov (2003); Teloh (1981); Vlastos (1954). Both lists may be round-
ed off by the collection of essays edited by Welton (2002). A good conspectus of the global 
state of scholarship regarding the Forms can be found in Erler (2007, 390–406, 699–703).
3  As for actual textbooks, the famous one by Bertrand Russell, though perhaps not intended as 
a textbook in the standard sense, teaches us that "Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more 
real than the common world of sense, the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to 
the world of sense whatever pale reflection of reality may belong to it" (1912, 144). A hun-
dred years later, a Companion to Plato can still be found unable to introduce the Forms with-
out reference, at least in scare quotes, to "what is often described as a 'two world ontology'" 
(Press 2012, 174). In between, something of the tradition we are challenging has evidently 
survived. What it is that has survived is captured rather well in an anthology exclusively on 
Plato's Forms, in fact, titled Plato's Forms, where the editor's dispassionate overview presents 
tradition as firmly embracing a two-world interpretation: "The most famous view associated 
with one of the greatest thinkers of all time is a view that seems to defy our common sense, 
to challenge our deepest beliefs about the very nature of reality; for it seems to tell us that the 
flesh-and-blood world of which we are a part, the world of change and time in which we pass 
our lives, is somehow 'less real' than a world we can only see in our minds" (Welton 2002, 1).
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Against the tradition thus defined, the purpose of this paper is to recom-
mend and pursue a course correction in Plato studies, specifically in connection 
with the two problems identified above. The first correction is that Plato works 
with a single world that is stratified into ontological layers with a sliding scale of 
reality where there is enough room both for Forms and for particulars as well as 
for their separation. We call this scenario the 'two-level' model (in contrast to the 
two worlds typically assumed instead), not because there are only two levels, but 
because Forms occupy one level, particulars, another, in a hierarchical ontologi-
cal configuration comprising layer upon layer, complete with sublayers, collec-
tively representing and facilitating a gradation of reality, both within and between 
the two levels in question. Otherwise, this is not a binary or bipolar model of real-
ity, nor an attempt to trade one sort of dualism for another, merely substituting the 
notion of level for that of world.
The second correction is that Plato's experimentation with abstraction can 
be better understood in terms of three different categories of Forms instead of a 
single homogeneous breed answering for every possibility (where candidates for 
Forms can be as diverse as justice, horse, and motion). Taken up in detail later, 
the three categories are Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms.
These two course corrections are best pursued as a single revisionist pro-
ject bringing the main strands of Plato's thought into better alignment. This is be-
cause they do not solve mutually independent problems in separate areas of Plato 
studies but explicate Plato's philosophical (rather intuitive) vision in the broadest 
terms, where they are jointly necessary for a comprehensive sketch.
The reliability of the big picture is important not just for its own sake but 
also for avoiding infelicities at the level of details. The potential for misdirection 
is significant, for example, in precluding proper insight into Plato's thinking in 
other areas and on other problems. One such case is the inadequacy of prevail-
ing patterns of interpretation to account for the general axiological orientation 
of Plato's thought, or, perhaps more perspicuously, for the primacy of intrinsic 
value in his philosophical projects. Everything aims at the Good, but there can be 
no enlightenment, moral or otherwise, so long as the Good resides in an entirely 
different world, along with all else that is fine and decent and noble. We aim to 
show that the big picture, revised as promised, naturally emphasises the Platonic 
devotion to value.
This is a bold undertaking that goes against the grain of current scholar-
ship. While we intend to supply all the evidence pertinent to our proposals for 
revision, there can be no proof in the strict sense of the term. The leading alterna-
tive, after all, is not itself based on proof but on a tradition of interpretation dat-
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ing back to antiquity. This is not to say that we can whimsically replace that with 
our own interpretation while dispensing with the need to provide reasons and 
reasoning. Nevertheless, in the end, the acid test will be whether we end up with 
a reconstruction that makes better sense of Plato than one that places the Forms 
in one world, the particulars, in another, and leaves no room for an experience 
of value, which rests with all the good stuff in the world of Forms, not where we 
dwell, in the world of particulars. Likewise, with regard to the classification of 
Forms into three categories, another acid test will be whether the variegation, 
which constitutes a natural fit with an already stratified reality, is truer to Plato 
than is undifferentiated abstraction confined to an alternate reality. In the final 
analysis, then, the reason that there can be no proof in the strict sense is that this 
is not so much a disquisition as it is a thought experiment, much in the way that 
Plato propounds his own philosophy.
That said, our understanding of the way Plato propounds his own philoso-
phy does not presuppose any particular pattern in his development as a philoso-
pher or as a writer. Nor is our general initiative helped or hindered by any given 
order in which the dialogues may have been written. This is not the place to argue 
against developmental accounts or chronological approaches, but ignoring them 
should give no pause, as we can hardly be obligated to adopt them.4
2. Stratification of Reality
Plato's philosophy has an unmistakable axiological orientation. His dialogues 
constitute a procession of thought experiments aiming at that which is desirable 
for its own sake, or, what is the same, that which is good in itself (agathon, kalon, 
and the like). This emphasis on value is difficult to reconcile with the attribution 
of metaphysically transcendent Forms to what is not explicitly good.
This problem has a considerable bearing on the general interpretation of 
Plato. Several scholars have, over the years, taken Plato's commitment to value-
neutral Forms and to trivial Forms as a given, or at least as a possibility, some 
4  Platonic chronology is a field of its own. For an overview of problems and solutions, see 
Alican (2012, 148–88); for substantive contributions, see Thesleff (1982 [= 2009, 143–382]; 
1989, 1–26; 1999, 108–16 [= 2009, 489–97]). For a brief account of Thesleff on Platonic chro-
nology, see Alican (2012, 185–88) and Nails (1995, 59, 134). For sweeping documentation of 
the main schools, major trends, and best achievements in Platonic chronology, with the con-
venience of tabular presentations, see Nails (1995, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 76, 111, 112, 131, 134, 
203). Cf. also the chronological reference in the latter part of n. 10 below.
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even embracing not merely neutral and trivial Forms but also negative Forms, 
while others have expressed reservations on all three fronts.5 Disagreement 
among scholars often depends on what is meant by the terms used. Reconsid-
ering Plato's so-called theory of Forms,6 primarily through a close look at the 
dialogues, may help resolve superficial disagreements and expose genuine dif-
ferences. Chief among them will be the stratification intended in place of the 
duplication assumed.
A popular makeshift is the assumption of a unique, separate, and complete 
world of Forms that corresponds to our own world, somehow accounting for 
many of its features, or, by some counts, for all of them, including plurality and 
change, but sharing none of its deficiencies.7 On close inspection, the difficulties 
of such an assumption are legion, foremost of which is that Plato himself pro-
vides little ground for it in the dialogues.8
We normally expect the metaphor of 'world' to include plurality, variety, 
and change, as well as some indication of what is good and bad for the things 
within. Perhaps this, the plurality, the variety, the change, together with a sense 
of good and bad, is what we expect because of the way our own world looks to 
5  See, for example, the references in Erler (2007, 397) and in Guthrie (1978, 97–100).
6  Attributing to Plato a 'theory of Forms' is becoming an increasingly delicate matter, with 
many scholars contending that he never actually held any such theory, and some holding 
that he never held any theory at all: Annas (1981, 217–41); Gonzalez (2002, 31–83); Hyland 
(2002, 257–72); Sayre (1994, 167–99; 2002, 169–91); Williams (2006, 148–86, especially 
154). A review of the literature, together with a discussion of the possibilities, can be found 
in Alican (2012, 110–29).
7  While scholars tend to distinguish between ontological and epistemological versions of the 
two-world model, our own project leaves no room for this, neither physically nor logically. 
This is because denying a two-world ontology makes it superfluous to deny a two-world epis-
temology. Since the opposite does not hold, however, the epistemological version can fruitfully 
be explored by those who countenance a two-world ontology, or by those who do not take any 
sort of stand on the ontology. A sweeping acquaintance with the current state of scholarship 
on the epistemological issue can be had through two complementary pieces by Smith (2000, 
2012), where one will also find a substantive contribution toward a solution. Nails (2013, 78, 
n. 3), for one, considers Smith (2000) to have settled the epistemological issue, having demon-
strated that the two-world model fails to account for Plato's epistemology. Yet, as she admits, 
not everyone considers the matter closed. For other recent discussions with Plato's epistemol-
ogy in the forefront, see, for example, Rowe (2005) and Butler (2007).
8  The ideal model of a good state in the Republic (9,592a–b), and of the cosmos in the Timaeus 
(28a–30d, see also 51d–52d), have been adduced. But thoroughgoing metaphysical dualism is 
not the only possible reading, and Plato himself hardly indicates internal conflicts of opposites 
in either model.
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us. Perhaps, then, we do not have the right to expect it of all possible worlds. But, 
either way, we can rest assured that we can neither expect it nor extract it from 
any world of Forms as such.
Even if some, or most, of the Forms are understood to be immanent, as 
some scholars and schools have been inclined to maintain, this does not typically 
come with a reduction in the number of worlds.9 However that may be, our hu-
man world is not simply a replica of a world of Forms.
Earlier fascination with recovering Platonic chronology, thereby giving 
rise to the legend of Plato's development from immanentism to transcendentism, 
can also be set aside safely, now that Plato scholarship has established itself as 
moving away, especially rapidly in recent years, from certain patterns of inter-
pretation dominating the field through most of the twentieth century. Much of the 
dogma handed down uncritically from generation to generation is either gone or 
on its way out.10
One that has proven persistent, however, is the dogma of the 'two worlds', 
which continues to distort the intellectual legacy of Plato.11 The separation 
(chōrismos) of Forms from particulars was already being discussed in Plato's 
time, both by him and by those around him, as a logical problem.12 But what if 
it was not a real problem for Plato (as some have argued on various grounds)? 
What if his universe was a single one (as intimated in the Timaeus), a continuum 
of levels, somewhat as Plotinus saw it? These are not intended as purely rhetori-
9  Standing out among the numerous treatments of this issue are Fine's articles on separation 
(1984) and immanence (1986), one each, and Devereux's single article (1994) on separation 
and immanence.
10  A progressive mindset was already in place twenty years before the composition of the pre-
sent article, as evidenced, for example, in an anthology editor's open praise for the devotion of 
contributors to the interpretive principle that "the thought rightly attributable to the dialogues 
is likely to be something other than the traditional set of dogmas or doctrines, whether unitary 
or developing, that are found both in textbooks and scholarly writing, the philosophical system 
called Platonism" (Press 1993, 5). The backlash against developmentalism has been particular-
ly harsh, as can be readily verified in the front matter of the Hackett edition of Plato's Complete 
Works, whose editor demonstrates a pedagogical vigilance so strong as to "urge readers not to 
undertake the study of Plato's works holding in mind the customary chronological groupings 
of 'early', 'middle', and 'late' dialogues" (Cooper 1997, xiv). For related issues in chronology, 
see n. 4 above.
11  Our characterisation of the two-world model as a 'dogma' coincides with terminology 
('dogma ') also favoured by Nails (2013).
12  See especially Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's Metaphysics (987a29–b35, 1078b7–
1079a4, 1086a30–b12); cf. Fine (1984, 1986), Devereux (1994), and Nails (2013).
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cal questions but as a springboard to opening up interpretive possibilities, starting 
with direct answers in the next section.
3. A Two-Level Model
The alternative we propose in place of a two-world model of interpretation is a 
two-level model. Readers may follow our reasoning as a thought experiment, 
which, we believe, provides a grounding for a proper explication of the notion 
and theory of Forms, starting with their purported transcendence.
The metaphor of levels, contrary to that of worlds, exposes a value dif-
ferential between a higher and a lower order of entities or phenomena. The com-
paratives are important. The underlying ontology is that of two basic levels un-
derstood as belonging together (in Platonic koinōnia) like, say, sky and earth in 
the worldview of Plato's contemporaries — or like gods and humans, masters 
and slaves, truths and beliefs, abstractions and their instantiations. It was natural 
for Plato to have held this two-level vision of a single world, an intuitive outlook 
always present in his thought but only indirectly reflected in what he said and 
wrote.13 This vision is in all respects primary to any theory of Forms. Plato is 
likely to have developed it early on, drawing on a combination of general Greek 
views and more explicit Presocratic thought.
The idea of a two-level vision in Plato was first brought up and 
articulated in some detail by De Vogel in 1986.14 It was later adopted as an 
interpretive paradigm and developed further by Thesleff.15 The model can be 
illustrated particularly well through contrasts typical of Plato's view of reality. 
For this purpose, a representative set of ten pairs of complementary concepts 
can be taken either in a regular list or distributed alongside a horizontal 
separator as follows:16
one same stable divine soul leading intellect truth knowledge defined
many different changing human body being-led senses appearance opinion undefined
13  See, for example, Thesleff (1999, 11–12, 28–29 [= 2009, 397–98, 413–14]).
14  See De Vogel (1986, 50, 62, and passim).
15  See Thesleff (1993, 17–45; 1999, 11–52 [= 2009, 397–436]). Cf. Press (2007, 159–71). See 
further the first of the two dogmas in Nails (2013, 78–87).
16  The example is from Thesleff (1999, 27 [= 2009, 411]).
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The concepts in question are not true opposites (as some similar ideas are in Ori-
ental and Pythagorean thought).
In the same contexts, it has been argued, and it can easily be argued further 
and in greater detail, that Plato applies his two-level vision to a wide variety of 
aspects of method and thought. Take, for instance, his typical 'dialectic' where the 
philosophical leader of the discussion naturally 'knows' more than he says, yet 
profits from his lower-level partners. Or take his typical irony, especially through 
Socrates, or his word-play, where truth is covertly balanced against appearance. 
Or take the multilevel structure of his utopian State. The levels operate together. 
Here, we will focus just on the level of the Forms.
If transcendent Forms do not constitute a world separate from the one we 
occupy, they can be assigned, at any rate, to a different level within the same 
world. The level of the Forms need not correspond to that of the physical in de-
tails, but it is not divorced from it either. They are two aspects of the same reality. 
One world, two levels — this may be as close as we get to Plato's vision of the 
abstract, where different terms and concepts will, inevitably, not be as clearly dif-
ferentiated as we might wish.17
A two-level interpretation recommends itself for two reasons in particular. 
First, the imagery of two levels comes with a complementary hierarchical struc-
ture within a single reality, which then stands as a cohesive whole where points, 
or regions, or just ways, of contact are easier to grasp and to defend, as opposed to 
the juxtaposition of disjointed and polarised worlds where any connection would 
be tenuous at best. Second, the two-level model readily accommodates the Pla-
tonic orientation toward the Good, owing, again, to its unitary hierarchical struc-
ture, whereas the two-world interpretation falls short in this respect because it 
places the Good in some other, wholly separate world, thereby undermining the 
possibility of orientation toward it. Moreover, the differentiation and order that 
can be had simultaneously in a single world with two levels is uniquely hospitable 
to a proper classification of Forms, paving the way out of the present cacophony 
in the variety of constructs passing for Forms.18
17  Plato sometimes refers to a noetic topos outside the cosmos: Republic 6,509d, 7,517b; Phae-
drus 247c–d, 248b; it is 'over' us, as the sky is over the earth. See also Timaeus 50a–52e (where 
the 'receptacle' is added as a third level).
18  Plato's notion of the Good was the cause of much perplexity in the fourth century. This was 
evidently due not merely to what he made available through the dialogues but also to a notori-
ous public lecture on the subject. See, for example, Alican (2012, 84–87) and Thesleff (1999, 
104–05, 164–65 [= 2009, 485–86, 531]). See also Ferber (1989).
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In short, keeping things in the same world has its advantages. Fashioned 
after a koinōnia of sorts, as between upstairs and downstairs, the model finds 
ample support in the canonical corpus: Consider for a start, the divided line in 
the Republic (6,509d–511e), the ladder of love in the Symposium (209e–212a), 
with Eros and Socrates as a mediating power, and the world-soul in the Timaeus 
(35a–36d).19
4. Classification of Forms
Another fundamental question for the present is: What do we mean by the term 
'Form' as identified with what was traditionally called an 'Idea'? Both terms, 'Form' 
and 'Idea', have some misleading connotations in modern languages, and 'Form' 
is easily confused with the Aristotelian eidos. Worse, Plato's own terminology is 
hopelessly inconsistent. And he never did put forth a clear and complete account 
of the Forms. What we have instead are tentative visions (sometimes literally 
Socratic dreams) or suggestions proposed in different situations and at 
different times — all extremely difficult to sort out, as contemporary scholar-
ship is beginning to see.
Since Plato did not impose terminological preferences, or issue philosophi-
cal instructions, it is incumbent upon the community of Plato scholars to fig-
ure out the central characteristics (and the details, if possible) of what has been 
handed down as Forms (or Ideas). We suggest, following many interpreters since 
ancient times, that a Platonic Form must be at least a universal, though always a 
unique one, and preferably a positive one, functioning as a typical characteristic 
(or as a standard or model) of phenomena or occurrences on the sensible level of 
our world.
We will be expanding on this characterisation throughout the paper, but a 
few points of clarification might be useful immediately: First, we say 'at least' be-
cause not all universals are Forms. The aphorism that "Forms are what particulars 
fail to be" can be extended further, though with caution, to assert that Forms are 
what universals fail to be.20 This is not to say that they are not universals, but that 
19  See also Republic 5,477a–478c. For the notion of universal koinōnia, cf. Republic 5,462a–
464d, 7,537c, 9,585b–c; Phaedo 100d; Theaetetus 147d–e; Sophist 248a–e; Laws 12,967d–e.
20  The elegantly abbreviated account that "Forms are what particulars fail to be" belongs 
specifically to McCabe (1994, 60), though the opinion expressed therein is common in the 
literature.
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they are indeed that and always something more. Second, though still in the same 
vein, this is partly the sense in claiming that they are unique, each one being just 
what it is, and not simply an example of the kind of thing we call 'Form'. The 'just 
itself', in Plato's thought, is not identical with what we now call 'justice', though 
we will, for convenience, use the latter term as shorthand. Third, and finally, by 
'positive', we mean something worth seeking or imitating, of course, from Plato's 
point of view.
Explicating Plato's Forms in terms of universals, even if it is only to say 
that they are much more than this, is open to misunderstanding. Universals no 
longer stand for the same thing they did with Aristotle, and the contemporary dis-
cussion is far from a consensus. Nor does the conceptual development between 
then and now add up or average out to a uniform understanding.
The commonplace that Plato reified universals does not go far toward cap-
turing what Plato thought to be a Form. And the question lurking at the end of 
that statement ('what Plato thought to be a Form') is not the right question to ask, 
at least not for us, but also not of us. We cannot say what a Form is, as if it were 
just one thing, or one type of thing, because we do not think that the Form for 
justice and the Form for bed, to take just a couple of examples, are really the same 
kind of thing, a Form. We believe Plato to have experimented with abstraction in 
several different ways, ending up with different results, which are best classified 
in different categories or divisions. We are not prepared to draw any develop-
mental conclusions from this, instead remaining content to let the dialogues fall 
where they may in terms of chronological order. But we can, after all, say quite 
a bit about the different types of entities tradition has handed down as Forms (or 
Ideas).
We have to keep in mind, first, that universals were yet to be discovered, 
or invented, depending on one's perspective, when Plato seems to have reified 
them, second, that he did not merely reify them but almost deified them (in the 
loose sense of giving them godlike 'upper level' qualities, not, of course, to wor-
ship them), and, third, that justice and horseness and everything in between are 
not reified or deified into the same kind of thing, or to the same extent, thus leav-
ing a broad spectrum of ontological profiles as the constituents of reality and our 
experience of it.
Yet we find the analogy with universals helpful as a starting point, which 
doubles as a point of departure. We are aware of scholarly opposition to identify-
ing Plato's Forms with universals (which is not what we are doing). Some protest 
because they, like us, find that universals fall short of Forms, others, because they 
deny that universals exist while recognising that Plato considered the Forms real, 
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yet others, because universals are not individuals whereas Plato's Forms are, and 
the list goes on.
But we have to start somewhere. So, we may as well start with the praise 
Socrates receives from Parmenides for separating properties from the things of 
which they are properties (Parmenides 130b). And this cannot be too far to reach 
from universals, anyone's universals. The point of departure that drives our own 
understanding is the importance Plato attaches to intrinsic value, not to be found 
in mere universals, nor in reified ones, which makes it a feature lost in the typi-
cally monochrome Forms taken up in much of the literature.
We may profitably recognise three distinct divisions among the referents of 
what are usually taken collectively as Forms:
•  Ideal Forms: These are metaphysically transcendent entities that embody, 
on the upper level of reality, the perfection of qualities (justice, temperance, 
knowledge, etc., as in Phaedrus 247d–e) we aspire to on the lower level. 
They have an axiological orientation culminating in the Good. Put simply, 
they are charged with positive intrinsic value.
• Conceptual Forms: These are universals corresponding, on the upper level 
of reality, to such particulars as are manifested, on the lower level, with 
mutual similarity but varying degrees of reality and importance (to Plato), 
including concrete things (horse, ship, water) and their properties, qualities, 
or attributes (speed, size, colour), as well as various phenomena, broadly 
taken to comprise events, actions, and experiences, but excluding (again 
from Plato's point of view) things that are either imaginary or intrinsically 
bad, not because Conceptual Forms are intrinsically good, but because they 
have no value of their own, only by association (with Ideal Forms, as ex-
plained later), which does not make it intrinsic value.
• Relational Forms: These are relational universal concepts, that is, correla-
tive abstractions taken in contrasting pairs of apparent opposites jointly cov-
ering both levels of reality and collectively exhausting the entire two-level 
ontology. They, too, are value-neutral in and of themselves. A good example 
is the pairing of rest / motion and of same / other among the megista genē in 
the Sophist (254d–e).
Retaining the term 'Form' as part of the name for each division is a reminder that 
the classification21 pertains to what has long been discussed under this single 
21  The classification we propose is silent on mathematicals (numbers and shapes) largely be-
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name (and, before that, and still in non-anglophone contexts, under another single 
name, 'Idea').
That said, pressed for a choice, we might have to admit that Forms proper 
are the constructs we have called 'Ideal Forms', and that these may just as well be 
called 'Ideas' instead of 'Forms'. Conceptual Forms, then, would stand out as the 
main cause of the difficulty in deciding whether there is a Form for everything or 
only for some things. And any difficulty in this is liable to be exacerbated by the 
additional division of Relational Forms, which are, in essence, universal catego-
ries, that is, basic concepts for understanding the cosmos, not in its minutiae, nor 
from a moral perspective, but as a structured whole.
A visual aid often makes complex thought more accessible. Fortunately, 
Plato provides one of the most memorable visual aids in the history of philosophy 
— the divided line.22 His simile in the centre of the Republic (6,509d–511e) is 
in many ways illustrative of his two-level vision, here subdivided into four seg-
ments. It can be taken as a cross section of Plato's universe, with the philosopher's 
ontology and epistemology in the foreground. And it represents the hierarchy of 
what, to him, is valuable. Let us mark the four segments from top to bottom as 
(a), (b), (c), and (d). If the noetic segment (a) is understood to cover the Ideal 
Forms culminating in to agathon, it is sensible to assign the dianoia segment (b) 
to Conceptual Forms. Since Plato must have known that segments (b) and (c) are 
by geometrical necessity equal in length, whichever proportion is chosen for the 
first cut, it is reasonable to assume a close correspondence between (b) and (c), 
the latter of which represents visible things (on the higher, more important, and 
more valuable of the bottom two levels): zōa, all that is phuteuton, even skeuas-
ton of some value (6,510a), and geometrical figures (6,510c, 6,510e). They all 
have corresponding Conceptual Forms on level (b).23 Relational Forms, rather 
cause Plato himself is not clear on what these are. On the testimony of Aristotle (Metaphysics 
987b14–17, 1059b5–14; cf. 'eidetic numbers' at 1080a23, 1081a23–25), a common interpre-
tation has been that Plato took mathematicals to be a separate category between Forms and 
particulars. This assignment of an intermediate position may have been inspired by a pytha-
gorising interpretation of segment (b) of the divided line (discussed at the end of the present 
section). We also find Plato's interest in 'eidetic numbers' to be a late pythagorising experiment. 
(See section 9 below, especially n. 61.) Nevertheless, mathematicals can be accommodated in 
our classification scheme as a special type of Conceptual Form, associated with Ideal Forms, 
and approximating to them through a process of ontological ascent (taken up in section 7.1 
below).
22  For this much-discussed metaphor, we refer only to Thesleff (1999, 31–32, 70–72 [= 2009, 
416, 453–55]).
23  For the distinction between Conceptual Forms and 'concepts', see section 7.1. As for the 
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than claiming a place on one level or other, collectively constitute a lateral projec-
tion of the structural representation.
Even with the appeal to the divided line, however, much of the foregoing 
discussion has proceeded with a predominance of hypotheses over documenta-
tion. The remainder of the paper is devoted to fleshing out the proposed clas-
sification, bringing out some of the more important details, and, in the process, 
showing how the proposal fits in with what Plato said, and, to some extent, with 
how that has been interpreted.
5. Terminological Clues and Other Observations
Scholars traditionally look for linguistic clues to sort out the details of Plato's 
conceptual apparatus. First on their list is to check the occurrence of the terms 
eidos or idea, designations giving the Ideas, and, later, the Forms, their modern 
name.
Although the typical search for Forms, with eidos (or idea) as the descrip-
tor, is a generic one, undifferentiated as to this or that division in the classification 
we are advocating, the result is far more likely to identify a Conceptual Form than 
an Ideal Form, and oftentimes even to pick out nothing more than a concept. In-
deed, both terms are also applied to universals, with no metaphysical overtones.
Generally speaking, in Plato's dialogues, eidos (and idea) often approaches 
our notion of concept. But a concept is not a Form.
Some developmentalists have assumed that eidos and idea became markers 
of transcendence when Plato began to use them for abstract concepts. This often 
includes the assumption that eidos and idea point to Ideal Forms. And sometimes 
they do. But what are we to do when they point elsewhere?
The etymology of the words eidos and idea is of little help here. They 
seem to be practically synonymous; hence, we can focus on the more common 
eidos. Originally, it just meant 'shape' in the sense of 'outward appearance', but 
also (and still before Plato) signified a mental vision of the characteristic shape 
of something, thereby pointing to types, or kinds. To Plato, it may sometimes 
denote an ideal shape, a model of sorts, and thus, implicitly, a concept of positive 
metaphor on hand, we may imagine the line as drawn in the sand, or on a slate, before the dra-
matic audience, but, unfortunately, we do not know exactly by what construction Plato wanted 
the second cut to be made 'in the same ratio' (Republic 6,509d), or whether the topmost seg-
ment (a) was meant to be the longest or the shortest one. The interpretation has varied since 
ancient times.
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value. It remains unclear, however, to what extent this nuance was influenced by 
an emerging theory of Ideal Forms.
Plato may well have adopted the term eidos (idea) both for Ideal Forms 
and for Conceptual Forms in oral discussions of ontology and epistemology. The 
fact that the terms are hardly ever present in the so-called early dialogues may be 
because these texts are probably, by and large, addressed to larger audiences. At 
any rate, eidos and idea are neither systematic designations of Ideal Forms nor 
reliable indicators of value. The standard reference is to typical shapes, typical 
forms, but in a more abstract way than, say, morphē or schēma.24 After eidos and 
idea began to be employed for Ideal Forms as well, they took on a metaphysical 
connotation in addition to their original meaning. This assessment is consistent 
with traditional interpretations,25 though its relevance to the chronology of the 
dialogues is doubtful.
To go somewhat further into this complex of problems, we may infer that, 
in Plato's thought, pointedly abstract concepts automatically tend to be associ-
ated with the upper level of his universe, given its abstract nature. Insofar as 
concepts are understood to be common denominations of a group of phenomena 
(i.e., universals), and, further, taken to be accessible through the mind rather than 
the senses, they are already acquiring greater distinction, whereupon, if they are 
conceived to be somehow real and important and not imagined, they merit a 
higher ontological ranking than their concrete manifestations. We deal with this 
inference in section 7.
A more reliable way of tracing the appearance of Ideal Forms in the dia-
logues is to search for qualifications of universals by the term auto (auto to, 
hauto, kath' hauto, etc.), often rendered into English as 'as such' or as '(in) itself'. 
Similarly suggestive are words for that which 'really and always is' or that which 
is 'true' (ho estin, aei, alēthēs, etc.) or 'pure' (eilikrinēs). Even a preliminary effort 
to enumerate such instances can quickly grow to cover a dozen dialogues. Con-
sider, for instance, the contexts of Cratylus 439c–d (kalon, agathon, in Socrates' 
dream); Euthydemus 292d (epistēmē, but in ironical context); Hippias Major 286d 
(kalon, 289d with eidos); Laches 194a (aretē, playfully personified); Meno 100b 
(aretē, cf. 72c); Parmenides 130b (homoiotēs, see section 8, below), 134b (to ka-
lon, to agathon); Phaedo 65d–66a (dikaion, kalon, agathon ... megethos, hugieia, 
ischus), 106d (zōē, with eidos); Phaedrus 247d (epistēmē, seen by gods on their 
24  Note that schēma can be used for 'concept', as in Meno 74b, Sophist 267c–d, and Statesman 
277a.
25  See, for example, Ross (1951, passim).
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winged journey); Philebus 59b–c (the problem of to alēthestaton, being close to 
ta aei kata ta auta hōsautōs ameiktota echonta); Republic 4,435b (dikaiosunē, 
with eidos, cf. 4,435e, 7,517e), 5,479e (to kalon, to dikaion, cf. 6,505a, hē tou 
agathou idea, not sufficiently well known); Sophist 248a–b (assumptions of the 
eidōn philoi); and, of course, Diotima's memorable portrayal of to kalon at Sym-
posium 211b (to kalon ... auto kath' hauto meth' hautou monoeides aei on).26 Ter-
minological clues of the auto type (or 'truly' or 'purely') almost always indicate 
an Ideal Form.
A somewhat less reliable mark of Ideal Forms is the characteristic refer-
ence to the relation between Forms and particulars as a presence or a partaking. 
It is less reliable because it is also, at least occasionally, extended to Conceptual 
Forms and Relational Forms. Considering the use of terms such as parousia, 
metechein, koinōnia (Phaedo 100d), it seems that the discussion of 'participation' 
was not limited to Ideal Forms. See, for example: Gorgias 467e–468a, 498d; Eu-
thydemus 301a; Hippias Major 289c–d, 294a; Lysis 217b–e; Sophist 247a. Pos-
sibly, though, there was a religious background giving a specific connotation to 
Plato's employment of the words. The question of particulars 'reflecting' or 'imi-
tating' Forms (à la Parmenides) may be of a different origin.
Ideal Forms are, in the first place, ideal qualities (or capacities) of gods and 
of humans at their best (i.e., philosophers). This is a remarkable fact. It points to 
the divine upper-level as a model for ideal human behaviour.27 At the same time, 
it reflects the Socratic search for universals in human sophia.28 The latter has tra-
ditionally been regarded as a feature of the 'early dialogues', though the prospects 
of dating them with any precision remain dubious and controversial.29
We also find as possible candidates for Ideal Forms, entities representing 
physical things (e.g., man, fire), and universal concepts characterising our per-
ception of such things (e.g., similarity, hotness).30 This comes out clearly in the 
26  Note the context: The 'upper level' eventually reached by the philosopher is like an open sea, 
pelagos (Symposium 210d). See also Phaedo 109c–d and Republic 10,611b–d. Perhaps we may 
imagine to kalon shining like a sun over it (as in the Republic). For the notion of 'same' (auto), 
cf. the discussion on Relational Forms (section 8 below).
27  But Plato's point of view is not primarily religious; see Thesleff (1999, 12–15 [= 2009, 
397–401]).
28  Aristotle (Metaphysics 987b1–10) seeks the roots of Plato's theory in Socratic definitions. 
Dancy (2004, 23–208, 209–44), for one, explores this in great depth.
29  See the references to Platonic chronology in n. 4 above.
30  The case of fire (pur) is more complicated. Its significance for humans, from the earliest 
cosmologies onward, was beyond doubt. The Phaedo (103b–e) likewise assigns it a respect-
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order of presentation of the Forms in the Phaedo, and also in Socrates' aporia in 
the Parmenides (130c), both dialogues being explored further in the section on 
Relational Forms (section 8). The perceptually descriptive sort is probably the 
older of the two, as it is natural in Greek to operate with abstractions grounded 
in properties or attributes before doing so with the substances to which those 
properties or attributes belong. Separating the equality from the sticks, or, say, the 
largeness from the man, surely counts as a milestone in the history of our ongoing 
efforts to understand and describe the world around us, but working with the re-
mainder, that is, with the substances themselves, requires an altogether different 
operation of abstraction, marking the advent of kinds, types, and classes.
The roots of Ideal Forms are not in the eidē of physical things. A potter's 
or an artist's vision of a Grecian urn, or a carpenter's of a bed, is not, to Plato, 
metaphysically special. Even the external appearance of a demigod would not be 
very impressive in this regard.31 All these, and much more, are eclipsed by Ideal 
Forms.
Regarding a possible approximation of universals for physical things to 
Ideal Forms, see below, section 7. For similar approximations of the first member 
of Relational Forms to Ideal Forms, see below, section 8.
6. Ideal Forms
Commentators often complain of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and undeveloped 
lines of thought in Plato. This is especially true of the Forms, regarding which 
Plato is allegedly vague, laconic, and mercurial. A partial explanation of this fact 
is that Plato meant his Forms to be subject to philosophical, not public, discus-
sion; and discussion was best conducted orally. The Symposium, and perhaps also 
the Phaedrus, were exceptions, where the central issue concerns, however play-
fully, the heart of all theories of Forms, namely Ideal Forms.32
able position in contrasting it with snow (unpleasant and undesirable), but seems to treat only 
its property hotness (thermon), and not fire itself, as an Ideal Form (see further: section 8). Yet 
the rather sweeping presentation of Ideal Forms in the Timaeus (50c–52d) includes all four of 
the traditional elements, among them, fire (51b).
31  A satyr, for instance, or Eros in the Symposium. The playfully introduced phutourgos in 
the Republic (10,597d) is no cosmic Creator; cf. further n. 45 below. Broadie (2007, 232–53) 
rightly doubts (Ideal) Forms for artefacts in the early 'Platonistic tradition', but she does not 
consider Republic 6,510a–b, nor the floating category of Conceptual Forms.
32  See Thesleff (2002, 289–301 [= 2009, 541–50]) on publicity in Plato.
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Ideal Forms also fit clearly and directly into Plato's two-level vision as 
sketched above. And they have always been regarded (even by Plato himself, 
e.g., in the Phaedo and the Republic) as the most representative examples of 
Forms. For some explicit markers, see the preceding section. In the dialogues, 
the most detailed discussion of Ideal Forms as the philosopher's specialty can be 
found in the central books of the Republic, beginning with the contrast between 
'philosophers' and 'others' (5,475e ff.).
Like many other readers of Plato, and writers too, we, the present authors, 
are prepared to qualify Forms proper as transcendent, intelligible, paradigmatic, 
perfect, immutable, simple, and unique.33 We apply this list as a whole to Ideal 
Forms alone. And we add, as a note to be remembered throughout our argument, 
that these criteria explicate what is intrinsically good about the Forms from Pla-
to's point of view.
The list is fairly representative of the characteristics of Ideal Forms as they 
occur in the dialogues. But we do not pretend that it is final. Some of the descrip-
tors may be redundant, and others yet may need to be added. For example, we 
can immediately add that Ideal Forms are eternal and incorporeal, though these 
two features may arguably be said to be redundant with those on the original list. 
Both eternality and incorporeality (sometimes just 'invisibility') can probably be 
inferred directly from the original list, but Plato does make a point of mentioning 
them separately, for example, in the Phaedo (78c–80b).
Another important feature of Ideal Forms is an exalted ontological status 
representing ultimate reality, the cosmic embodiment of true being, in contrast 
to the contingent mode of existence at the lower, phenomenal level. The impor-
tance of this two-level feature is not just metaphysical but epistemological as 
well, since the ultimate reality in question, with the stability it embodies, con-
stitutes our only hope of attaining knowledge, the kind grounded in universal 
truth, as opposed to settling for mere opinion or belief (pistis on the divided line), 
33  Such features as we list here are likely to be found mentioned or discussed not only in 
scholarly articles or monographs but also in the expository sections of the growing stock of 
'companions' or 'guides' to Plato. The Continuum Companion to Plato (Press 2012), for exam-
ple, covers most of these features, if not more, in two short entries, one on the Forms (173–75, 
contributed by Kenneth Sayre) and one on ontology (218–20, contributed by Allan Silverman). 
Another example is Grube's monograph, Plato's Thought, where the first sentence alone goes 
through several of the features on our list (1935, 1). As for philosophy textbooks, a popular 
one currently in its eighth edition, describes the Forms as "independently existing, nonspatial, 
nontemporal 'somethings' ('kinds', 'types', or 'sorts') that cannot be known through the senses" 
(Soccio 2013, 131).
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affording no greater reliability than the illusory objects of perception at our own 
level of existence.34
A detailed analysis of clear or potentially clear cases of Ideal Forms in the 
dialogues would reveal a concentration on entities of moral value, which usually 
goes hand-in-hand with aesthetic value.35 They are, from a human perspective, 
good in an exemplary sense. They do not, as Ideal Forms, come with opposites 
that are also Ideal Forms. To elaborate, beautiful and ugly are opposite existential 
states, or aesthetic judgments, just as beauty and ugliness are opposite attributes 
or properties, but at that level, neither one is an Ideal Form, though both do well 
as concepts. We will return below (section 7) to Conceptual Forms. However, on 
the level of Ideal Forms, we are sure to find the beautiful right where Plato placed 
it, but we will find no sign of the ideally ugly throughout the canonical corpus.36
Our account builds on the cumulative evidence of passages in many dia-
logues, as illustrated in the preceding section, since none of them alone offers a 
clear and complete record.37
As Plato himself points out, this is a much-discussed matter (poluthrulēta, 
Phaedo 100b).38 And the abundance of discussion, of course, is not an indication 
that the matter, having been thoroughly examined, may now safely be put to rest, 
but that it is to be investigated further still. Plato often emphasises its difficul-
ties, even for philosophers. Although the original reference of this discussion is, 
dramatically, to Socrates and his associates, and, by extension, to Plato and his 
associates, it holds up rather well in transference to modern scholars and their as-
34  Causality might be added as yet another feature, as Forms are often taken to be causal agents 
of some sort. Platonic causality, to wit, the causality in and of the Forms, is a controversial 
topic. Nobody is sure how it works. What is going on is purportedly a kind of communion, 
inherence, partaking, or participation. But these concepts are not themselves all that clear; 
nor do they all conjure up the same image. The Aristotelian 'final cause' is not relevant either. 
A seminal attempt at clarification, to cite just one example, is the Vlastosian 'one-over-many' 
principle, but that just presents the Form as a unifying principle for a multitude of things of the 
same kind (Vlastos 1954, 320).
35  Such an analysis, that is, with the focus specified and the depth and breadth required, has 
never been conducted, not even by Ross (1951).
36  To be perfectly clear, we will not find the ugly as an Ideal Form: Otherwise, mention of 
the ugly (Euthydemus 301b, Hippias Major 289c–d, Republic 5,475e–476a, Theaetetus 186a), 
often in contrast to the beautiful, is common enough, but it remains at the conceptual level.
37  See the conspectus in Erler (2007, 390–406).
38  See Tarrant (2000, 43). Attaining certainty about to agathon is almost hopeless, as evi-
denced, for example, in Republic 6,496a–497d, 505a, Parmenides 134b–c, Timaeus 29d, and 
Philebus 64a–c. See further: n. 18 above.
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sociates. Two areas where our view differs from those of our associates are, first, 
that we find Ideal Forms to be charged with positive intrinsic value, a feature im-
plicit in the foregoing discussion and exemplified further below, and, second, that 
we consider these criteria to be features of Ideal Forms, not of just any Forms, 
and certainly not of things that are not Forms.
7. Conceptual Forms
7.1. Conceptualisation and Formalisation
Very few of the innumerable abstractions with which the human mind operates 
deserve to be labelled 'Ideal Form'. This is clear enough from the criteria laid out 
in the preceding section. Yet many kinds of universals outside the core of Ideal 
Forms are traditionally (and apparently also by Plato) classified as Forms, what-
ever term may be used. What kinds? This has been one of the biggest stumbling 
blocks in Platonic theory since antiquity.
Classical Greek was eminently suitable for abstractions, both for using the 
ones in hand and for creating new ones, often as derivatives, or easily generated 
with the aid of the article to. For the most part, such abstractions have nothing 
to do with Forms. Adopting the somewhat anachronistic term 'concept' for all 
abstractions representing a universal, or for any type of phenomenon, including 
imaginary ones, we find no clear distinction in Plato between concepts and the 
words (names, onomata) that represent them.39 The linguistic expression is es-
sential, however, not only for Plato but also for enabling a discussion of concepts.
The linguistic expression is not just 'the thing' as Antisthenes and others 
had asserted.40 Spoken or written names of things, including what we would 
call 'concepts' as a general term for all abstractions, can always be expressed by 
words. If such concepts turn out to be 'real' or 'important' universals from Plato's 
perspective, we can expect him to place them on the upper level of his universe, 
39  Examples abound in the Cratylus and the Sophist. The Timaeus (52a) makes it clear that 
Ideal Forms are homōnuma with particular things. But, taken as words, concepts are naturally 
nouns, or substantivised infinitives, as in to eidenai (Phaedo 75d), rather than finite verbs. 
Though words and denominations vary, it is through them that the dihaeretic process may reach 
the Forms. See, for example, Statesman 261e–262b, 285a–287d; cf. also n. 49 below.
40  Diogenes Laërtius (Lives 6,3) reports that Antisthenes "was the first to define statement 
(or assertion) by saying that a statement is that which sets forth what a thing was or is" (Loeb 
translation).
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analogously with Ideal Forms. Examples follow below, but the claim itself can-
not be proven, nor its details fully worked out, in the space available for ancillary 
support for the main theses of a journal article.
On the other hand, both Conceptual Forms and the positive element in 
Relational Forms can, depending on the context, approximate to Ideal Forms, in 
which case they each tend to take on some of the associated features. However, 
there is no specific subset of features identified with Ideal Forms that tends to be 
taken on by the other two kinds when they approximate to Ideal Forms. This is 
an arbitrary tendency, not a systematic process. The question of which features, 
or that of how many, does not have a set answer, and must be decided on a case-
by-case basis. Plato is seldom exact on the sliding scale of his two-level vision.
A telling example of Plato's treatment of concepts is the 'dihaeretic method', 
with which he and his younger friends experimented. An experiment along these 
lines may perchance end up at the level of Ideal Forms.41 Normally, however, 
it would remain on a more linguistic level through 'division and collection', the 
so-called dialectical process of separating and grouping concepts. The concept of 
angler, for example, can be derived, divided, reconstructed, and combined with 
other concepts, but it never becomes anything like an Ideal Form. The method is 
likely to have been originally designed for definitional purposes, not as specula-
tive or theoretical exercises supporting an ontological system.42
From another perspective, even Ideal Forms are concepts (in addition to 
whatever else Plato would have them be), both in their Socratic origins, and from 
our own vantage point. The converse, of course, does not hold: Not all concepts 
are Forms, let alone being Ideal Forms. Nor are they all suitable for formalisation 
as such.
Nevertheless, it is evidently a short step from concept to Conceptual Form. 
To be more precise, the step, short or long, is from our conception of concept 
to our understanding of what Plato might likely have considered a Conceptual 
Form. Otherwise, projecting all this back into Plato is mostly a heuristic device 
for sorting out what he was doing. The simple explanation, given the premise 
that there is a Conceptual Form for just about everything, or, more accurately, for 
41  See n. 39 above. Clearly expressed in the Phaedrus (249b–c, 265d–266c); cf. also the Soph-
ist (253c–e), Statesman (287c), Philebus (16c–17a), and Hippias Major (301b ff.). The dialec-
tician knows how to proceed.
42  The Gorgias (462e–466e) provides some corroboration. See also Prodicus on semantic dis-
tinctions in the Protagoras (e.g., 340a–341e, 358a–e), and the eristic games in the Euthydemus.
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everything Plato found somehow real or important, is that anything Plato could 
and wanted to conceptualise ended up as a Conceptual Form.43
However, we should not make the distinction between concept and Form 
as fluent as that. Not everything has a Form, not even potentially. Plato makes 
this clear in all the dialogues where Forms (denoted as eidē or otherwise) are 
discussed as something specific, especially in the Parmenides. Forms belong to 
the upper level(s) of Plato's universe. And the lower level(s) are not set aside for 
replicas of them. But the continuity of and between levels must be kept in mind, 
as must the analogy between Ideal Forms and possible Forms of a lower status.
As we saw above (section 4), the divided line suggests a direct correspond-
ence between levels (b) and (c). The latter consists of physical, sensibly manifest 
things, a neutral category, neither good nor bad as such. In other words, these are 
things that are neither good nor bad in themselves, only instrumentally so, if at 
all, though the text itself is silent about their possible misuse or ugliness (Repub-
lic 6,510a). It is easy to infer, as we are prepared to do, that segment (b) of the line 
represents, though broadly and vaguely, what we call 'Conceptual Forms'. And it 
is reasonable to claim (as will be fleshed out in section 10) that no Platonic Form 
stands for the 'bad', and none, again, for the 'trivial'.
Relative importance, or value, is key here: Not all concepts are interest-
ing to Plato. Not even all Conceptual Forms are of equal relevance in Plato's 
universe. Some are more important than others. This is largely a reflection of the 
differential importance already existing at the phenomenal level. But Conceptual 
Forms stand for relatively 'reliable' things; they are not objects for conjecture or 
fantasy (as level (d) is on the line).
Plato seems to regard what we have called 'Conceptual Forms' as objects 
for opinion (albeit rational thought), not for noetic knowledge (Timaeus 51d–e; 
cf. Republic 5,475e–480a and the divided line).
Here, it is worth reiterating that the two-level vision, with its sliding scales, 
does allow concepts a partial approximation to Ideal Forms, denied by the cus-
tomary (Parmenidean) 'either/or' logic. Concepts may, as it happens, be used in 
contexts where they resemble Ideal Forms, even taking on some of the features 
enumerated in the preceding section. They then acquire a higher dignity, so to 
speak, than ordinary concepts. They become Conceptual Forms. The acquired 
43  See the discussion of the divided line above (section 4). Conceptual Forms, given their 
plenitude and their possibly exhaustive coverage of phenomenal experience, just may be Pla-
to's answer to Parmenides' emphasis on the importance of not underrating apparently trivial 
candidates for abstraction (Parmenides 130e). Trivialities (see the Sophist and the Statesman), 
however, probably interested the Academy more than they did Plato.
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dignity that marks this transformation also confirms their ontological status as 
suprasensible abstractions, perhaps with a few other impressive attributes, and 
thus secures for them a ranking higher up on Plato's stratification of reality.
Working with a two-level vision of reality, Plato is likely to have intui-
tively designed Conceptual Forms close to Ideal Forms, whether or not the term 
eidos (idea) is explicitly used. Here are some samples (from a vast assortment)44 
of eidos referring to a Conceptual Form, easily mistaken for an Ideal Form, if the 
criteria for the latter are not taken strictly into account: Gorgias 503e (dēmiourgoi 
blepontes pros ... eidos ti); Cratylus 389a–b, 390b (on the eidos of the carpenter's 
shuttle); cf. the apparent revelation at Republic 10,596a ("we are in the habit of 
positing a single eidos for the various polla to which we give the same name"), 
followed by the rather playful example at 10,596b–608b (on the eidos and idea 
of 'bed', made by the phutourgos45 and imitated by the carpenter, and, the result, 
in turn, by the artist, etc.); cf. also Timaeus 51c (on the possibility of an eidos for 
every object); Theaetetus 148d (dunamis); Sophist 248a (hoi tōn eidōn philoi, 
referring to Academic radicals), 253d (on the dialectician distinguishing eidē in 
dihaeretics); Statesman 258e (on the statesman, king, master, and so on, as one); 
Epistle 6,322d (hē eidōn sophia, probably including both Ideal Forms and Con-
ceptual Forms, as well as dihaeretics).
The same applies to the less common idea (e.g., Phaedo 104d, Phaedrus 
246a), but, here, the connotation of Ideal Form is perhaps more prominent.46
Plato was comfortable with ambiguity, as, for example, his use of irony 
and play suggests. No wonder eidos can be found, in the same context, standing 
for an Ideal Form as well as a Conceptual Form.47
To place the terminology in the context of the divided line, we may note 
that the term eidos is used in a broad sense for invisible objects (Republic 6,510c) 
and for classes of visible ones (6,510d), all the while pointing to abstract concep-
tuality (6,511c).
Sometimes we find markers other than eidos indicating the approxima-
tion of a concept to a Form. See, for instance, Phaedrus 260a (and 261c–d, ta 
44  See the lists in Des Places (1964, 159–61).
45  This rare term seems to stand for the demiurge of the entities of segment (b) on the divided 
line. See section 4 above; cf. also n. 31 above.
46  For this controversial issue, see Ross (1951, passim), Guthrie (1975, 114–21; 1978, 19–
29, and passim), and the list in Des Places (1964, 260–61). Cf. the possibly playful point at 
Theaetetus 203e, which is not directly concerned with Forms.
47  The parade example is Republic 4,445c. See section 7.2 below.
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ontōs agatha, etc., to dikaion); Republic 3,401c (some craftsmen attempt to reach 
the phusis of to kalon, etc., cf. 402c), 4,438c–439b (epistēmē autē, compared to 
thirst); Parmenides 133d–e (autos doulos, ho esti doulos); Sophist 235e (alēthēs 
summetria, cf. Statesman 284d, auto t'akribes); Timaeus 30c (ta noēta zōia, cf. 
37c); Philebus 59c (the pure, true, etc., and their cognates); Epistle 7,342a–344d 
(the 'philosophical digression', with the circle as an example of a Conceptual 
Form, cf. 342c).
It is often impossible for us, and probably was for Plato as well, to say 
precisely when a concept receives the connotation of a Form. Take, for instance, 
to dikaion. In Greek, it is sometimes synonymous with dikaiosunē (righteousness 
as an ideal human virtue), but it also implies what is right, whether in general or 
in a given situation or simply in theory (cf. the German das Rechte). Or consider 
to kalon, or any of the many nuances of epistēmē. Such value concepts become 
easily identified with Ideal Forms, if their reference is not clearly specified. The 
question of immanence or transcendence is largely non liquet.
We also leave another much-debated question open: Were Platonic theories 
of Forms more Socratic early on and less so later? That is to say, were they, in 
their beginnings, more dependent on the Socratic search for moral truth, or, as is 
alleged just as often, on craftsmen's and artists' search for models? To put it dif-
ferently, are they better captured by the eidos approach, perhaps as with Concep-
tual Forms, or by the auto approach, as with Ideal Forms? Since chronology is not 
our concern here, we prefer a Platonic open-ended 'both/and'.
7.2. Opposition and Polarisation
Contrary or contradictory concepts of positive and negative value are often con-
trasted in Plato's works, but, normally, only as concepts, not as Forms. To some 
extent, this is a rhetorical device for intensifying their sense. The tendency is to 
put the positive term first. There are many examples of this, including the follow-
ing: Charmides 169b (epistēmē of epistēmē and anepistēmosunē), 174c (epistēmē 
of to kakon te kai agathon);48 Meno 72a (manifestations of aretē and kakia); 
Phaedo 60b, 71a, 103b, and passim (opposites arise from one another, as hēdu 
from lupē, dikaioteron from adikōteron, etc.); Republic 3,402c (guardians must 
48  See the Lysis (216d–218c), where the somewhat ironical discussion of opposites, including 
to kalon and to kakon, brings with it the term parousia (217b), yet without a clear reference to 
Ideal Forms. Cf. n. 47 above. See further Euthydemus 301a–b.
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be able to recognise ta tēs sōphrosunēs eidē kai andreias ... kai ta toutōn enan-
tia, certainly not implying Ideal Forms); Sophist 247a–e (some are said to have 
a presence of dikaiosunē in their soul, others, the opposite); Symposium 209b 
(bringing forth with to kalon, never with to aischron).
Such cases usually have nothing to do with Ideal Forms. We are, however, 
on occasion, tempted to regard the first member of a pair of opposites as repre-
senting an Ideal Form. This applies particularly to Relational Forms (see section 
8). But there are other occurrences of the same nature.
For example, in the 'existential digression' of the Theaetetus (172c–179b), 
the two paradeigmata of life (176e) primarily concern the general orientation 
toward models of behaviour, not Ideal Forms. Still, at some point (175c), autē 
dikaiosunē slips in, together with its opposite, adikia.
A good example is Republic 5,475e–476e. Opening the discussion on true 
philosophers, Socrates contrasts the opposites kalon and aischron. Similarly, he 
says that each of the eidos (5,476a3) of dikaion, adikon, agathon, kakon, etc., is 
one, but that (in koinōnia) their manifestations are many. He then centres on the 
philosopher's orientation toward to kalon (5,476b), explicitly taken as an Ideal 
Form. A reasonable interpretation is to take eidos at 5,476a only in the sense of a 
concept, which can naturally have opposites. This passage seems to illustrate the 
famous apo skopias reflection of Socrates, looking back, as if 'from a lookout', 
over the dialogic ground covered, and declaring that there is one eidos of aretē, 
and an infinite number (of eidē) of kakia (4,445c).49 Here, the term eidos is used 
with a rather typical Platonic ambiguity: Uniqueness refers to an Ideal Form, plu-
rality, to various concepts (types, kinds).
Again, in the Republic, specifically in the final book, where we encounter 
one of Plato's proofs for the immortality of the soul (10,608d–611e), Socrates 
contends that everything susceptible of and to destruction has an inherent to ka-
kon (xumphuton, 10,609a) that brings about its destruction. But the inherent evil 
of the soul, namely, adikia, turns out to be incapable of destroying it. Plato never 
refers to an Ideal Form of the soul, though its contacts with the higher level are 
obvious. At any rate, this curious piece of argument suggests that negative Forms 
do not reach the uppermost level of Plato's universe.
49  See, for example, the Philebus (12c): many morphai of hēdonē, but one term for it. See also 
the Sophist (256e): many eidē of being, innumerable ones of non-being. The language used in 
the Cave does not reach the Forms; see Harte (2007, 195–215).
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8. Relational Forms
Relational Forms can, in principle, be spotted, in the dialogues where they oc-
cur, as contrasting pairs of relational universal concepts.50 The fact that they may 
appear on first impression to be little more than opposite terms can frustrate a 
search in any dialogue. One pitfall is the ever-present possibility of false posi-
tives grounded in the abundance of dialectical occasions for contrasting terms, or 
concepts, which usually turn out to be just that and nothing more.
But the search can be tricky even upon correctly diagnosing dialogues 
where Relational Forms would be sure to be present. Two such dialogues take 
us on a terminological merry-go-round between the auto (or 'true being', etc.) 
expressions, relational universal concepts, and the eidos label: Phaedo and Par-
menides.
In the Phaedo, the first of the sections concerned with Ideal Forms (65d–
66a) operates only with the auto type, and the examples are limited to concepts 
of positive value. But Relational Forms are ushered in with talk of similarity and 
dissimilarity (74a ff.). As noted above (section 4), these are not charged with in-
trinsic value. Returning to Ideal Forms, in the second, longer section (100b ff.), 
the term megethos (100e) is taken as a relational concept, and contrasted with 
smikrotēs.51 The extended search for a proof of the immortality of the soul em-
braces the terms eidos and idea for apparently the same entities, but the focus is 
on etiological and relational correlatives, notably: large and small; hot and cold; 
odd and even. The logic of the argument is controversial,52 but what is important 
for our purposes is that Plato is concerned with the universal dynamics of Forms, 
and that the first member of the relational pairs (large, hot, odd) dominates when 
contrasted with its counterpart (small, cold, even).53 Both are concepts, or pos-
sibly Conceptual Forms (either as eidos or as idea).54 However, when contrasted 
50  See the discussion, with references, in Thesleff (1999, 74–90 [= 2009, 457–72]), where they 
are called 'categories', following Plotinus.
51  The deuteros plous (Phaedo 99c) probably signifies Plato's own autobiographical shift from 
Presocratic mechanistic explanations to general theories of Forms, and not specifically a new 
approach to the latter. For problems in taking auto to ison as just an Ideal Form, see Sedley 
(2007, 82). Relational Forms are manifested with sliding scales; see further below in this sec-
tion.
52  See Alican (2012, 435–50); Denyer (2007, 87–96); Erler (2007, 608–11).
53  See Thesleff (1999, 7–10, 11–25, 74–90, 120–21 [= 2009, 393–96, 397–410, 457–72, 501–
02]).
54  Identifying the correlative components in each of certain pairs of Relational Forms (large 
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in a pair, though each one lacks intrinsic value, the first member easily presents 
itself, at least to the Greek mind in antiquity, and not just to Plato, as stronger and 
better, and hence, closer to Ideal Forms.
In the Parmenides, the presentation follows a different pattern. The discus-
sion of Forms opens (128e) with ostensible Ideal Forms characterised by auto 
(and ho estin) and combined with the eidos label (idea also occurs, but eidos 
quickly and decisively rises above all other designations). Already impressed 
with the insightfulness of the young Socrates in distinguishing Forms from par-
ticulars, Parmenides quickly comes to the point: What kinds of things have sep-
arate (i.e., upper-level) eidē? Socrates first mentions Forms that we have here 
called 'Relational Forms', namely, relational universal concepts, such as one and 
many, similarity and difference, rest and motion (129d–e, cf. 130b). A start with 
such concepts anticipates, dramatically, the Eleatic problem of the one versus 
the many, which turns out to be the underlying theme of the dialogue. To the 
relational universal concepts brought up by Socrates, Parmenides adds concepts 
familiar to us as Ideal Forms, namely, the just, the beautiful, and the good (130b), 
all readily accepted by Socrates as having separate eidē. The problem comes with 
the uncertainty of Socrates regarding the status of physical objects, such as man, 
fire, and water (130c) — we may call them 'Conceptual Forms' — but he insists 
that trivial things, such as hair, mud, and dirt (130c), cannot have eidē of their 
own. Something of an aporia sets in as Socrates admits unease at the inconsist-
ency of admitting Forms for some things but not for others. This prompts the 
prophetic remark of Parmenides that Socrates will eventually, through philoso-
phy, learn to appreciate the entire spectrum of things considered, never treating 
any of them as unworthy of attention (130e). The semblance of suggestion masks 
clever avoidance of either confirming or denying that they all have Forms. There 
is no commitment, just encouragement. The invitation of the passage to embrace 
the full range of phenomena, despite having already repudiated Forms for certain 
types of things, and having done so with conviction, points to the intricacies of a 
vs. small, hot vs. cold, odd vs. even) as Conceptual Forms points to at least some overlap, pos-
sibly even suggesting that Relational Forms in general are not so much a discrete division of 
Forms as they are a subdivision of Conceptual Forms. They would, on this interpretation, be 
Conceptual Forms that happen to be paired up as universal relational categories. However, we 
do not believe that this requires, or even warrants, compressing our classification from three 
to two divisions. The lateral perspective of Plato's two levels, as reflected in Relational Forms, 
opens up a new dimension for understanding the universe (as discussed further below in the 
present section). This function of Relational Forms is not just important (for Plato) but unique 
as well. We therefore believe that Plato himself embraced all three divisions in the course of a 
lifelong preoccupation with abstraction.
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proper understanding and classification of Forms. However, we may still doubt 
Plato's own interest in trivialities.55
Parmenides' subsequent elenchus operates chiefly with transcendent eidē, 
as does the logical (philosophical) exercise that occupies the second part of the 
dialogue. The elenchus involves Relational Forms treated as Ideal Forms (though, 
here, without neglecting the second, inferior member in the relevant pairs, thus 
bringing in smallness, plurality, and otherness), in addition to Ideal Forms proper, 
such as knowledge, beauty, and the good (134a–b). Conceptual Forms also seem 
to enter into the picture (133c–d), but there are no clear examples of negative 
Forms.56 As most interpreters agree, the elenchus can reasonably be taken as a 
preparation for the discussion in the Sophist of the sumplokē of eidē. We see here 
the involvement of both Relational Forms and some Conceptual Forms in the 
complex of Ideal Forms.
As already noted above (section 4), Relational Forms also come into play 
in the Sophist (254d–e), where the categories covered are introduced as megista 
genē (soon also termed eidē and ideai). In the Timaeus (35a–36d), they become 
elements of the world-soul, thereby giving it a mediatory but good-oriented func-
tion in the universe.
Drawing on these two dialogues, the list of examples from the Phaedo and 
the Parmenides can be expanded as follows: being (ousia) / being something 
(einai ti); one (hen, monon) / many, number (polla, plēthos, arithmos); sameness 
(tauton) / difference / (thateron, heteron, allon); stability, rest (stasis,57 hestanai, 
hēsuchazein, etc.) / change, motion (kinēsis, gignesthai, etc.); bigger (meizon, 
mallon) / smaller (elatton, hētton); whole (holon) / parts, divisibility (meros, mer-
iston).
The examples can easily be multiplied further, bearing in mind that the 
entities are not intrinsically value-laden as in Ideal Forms, and that they must 
always be taken in pairs as done above. They concern most concepts and all phe-
nomena. They are not true opposites, but they reflect the intertwinings of Plato's 
asymmetrical, two-level universe — seen laterally, as it were.
55  See n. 43 above.
56  The curious pair of 'being a master' and 'being a slave' (Parmenides 133e) is suggestive of 
Relational Forms. Yet the context is logical rather than axiological; i.e., the emphasis is on 
conceptual contrast rather than relative value.
57  The ambivalence of the opposite meanings of this term may be part of Platonic play.
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This lateral aspect allows us to term both members of the pairs 'Forms'. 
They are both abstractions, but the lower member is far from Ideal Forms.
We may also turn to the Theaetetus (185c–186c), where we find the sug-
gestion, set forth by Socrates' young partner, with encouragement from Socrates, 
that what we have called 'Relational Forms' constitute a prerequisite for abstract 
thinking about the All.58 The examples that follow are not Ideal Forms. They oc-
cur as contrasted pairs (with the first member pointing to a higher level), and they 
lack important characteristics of Ideal Forms (see section 6).
Reflections on Relational Forms, especially on the first member of each 
pair, may occasionally bring to mind Ideal Forms, as in young Socrates' open-
ing ponderings in the Parmenides (cf. similarity in the Phaedo, above). Yet this 
would take us down the wrong track. They are, more than anything, 'categories' 
or 'kinds of aspect' (genē is a more appropriate term than eidē) covering the two 
levels.59 The second member (many, movement, difference, etc.) can potentially 
be associated with bad things or evil qualities (see section 10), though it does not 
represent anything bad in itself. In the Sophist, such concepts are employed to 
explain the sumplokē of eidē, considered, in the first place, to be abstract concepts 
in the employment of language, and in particular (i.e., otherness) to make room 
for negation. The latter approach also concerns ostensible Ideal Forms (notably, 
Sophist 257d–258a).
Unfortunately, the use of the term eidos (and idea) in the context of Re-
lational Forms, and the occasional explicit allusion to Ideal Forms, especially 
in Socrates' opening remarks in the Parmenides, have had a snowball effect in 
conceptual confusion, as the clutter became perpetuated through contradictory 
interpretations throughout the course of Plato scholarship. A far less confusing 
alternative has been to label pretty much any abstraction a 'Form', which can look 
surprisingly credible with all the capitalisation and scare quotes.
58  After abruptly displacing the Good where one might naturally expect to find it at the top of 
the divided line (Republic 6,509d–511e), the unhypothetical first principle of the All remains 
confined to the famous metaphor, never to be heard of again, at least not outside that context. 
Much of the modern literature is thus understandably focused on whether the Good and the All 
are somehow the same: either two aspects of the same thing, or two ways of thinking about the 
same thing, or outright identical. The scholarly debate to date seems to be leaning toward the 
identity interpretation. See Nails (2013, 88–101) both for a succinct survey of the literature and 
for a substantive contribution challenging the mainstream interpretation.
59  Thesleff (1999, 74–90 [= 2009, 457–72]).
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9. First Principles
A further source of confusion is the problem of the two foundational principles 
(archai, prōta) Plato is said to have communicated orally: the one (hen) and the 
indefinite dyad (ahoristos duas). The indefinite dyad is also known as the 'great-
and-small', not to mention comparable expressions capturing its mathematical 
essence as being open (infinite) in both directions, toward greatness as well as 
toward smallness, toward more as well as toward less.60
The relation of these first principles to the theory of Forms became a major 
concern among Plato scholars as the Tübingen school made inroads in the 1960s 
into documenting the plausibility and importance of the so-called unwritten 
teaching (agrapha dogmata), the purported outlet for the exposition and discus-
sion of these matters, which are not to be found in the canonical corpus, except 
in a rudimentary fashion that requires interpretation, if not also interpolation and 
extrapolation.
Recently, it has been argued that the two principles, together with a theory 
of ideal numbers (a Pythagorean mystical tetraktus, i.e., 1+2+3+4=10, consti-
tuting the basis of arithmology and geometry), were a rather late pythagorising 
thought experiment by Plato, in fact, an application of the two-level model.61 Yet, 
late or otherwise, this complex of principles and theories should be neither con-
fused with Relational Forms nor wholly divorced from them. On the other hand, 
apart from the move toward ideal numbers — which Speusippus may have aban-
doned (Aristotle: Metaphysics 1086a3–6) — these developments are not relevant 
to Ideal Forms.
However, we know that some early commentators (probably members of 
Plato's Academy) came to take the indefinite dyad as somehow symbolising mat-
ter and evil.62 This trend corresponds to speculations about a metaphysically ac-
tive negative (bad, evil) psychic force, an outlook on the rise in the Academy 
toward the end of Plato's life. The influence of Persian thought is likely to have 
been in operation here. Reverberations of such speculations can be seen in new 
interpretations of the indefinite dyad, especially on the strength of textual support 
60  See Reale (1990, 67–68), among others, for terminological alternatives for the indefinite 
dyad.
61  Thesleff (1999, 91–107 [= 2009, 473–88]).
62  See, for example, Aristotle (Physics 203a4–16, 209b; Metaphysics 988a14–16, 1091b31–
35).
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from the introduction of a secondary (bad) world-soul in the Laws (10,896e–
897d) and Epinomis (988c–e).63
10. Negative Forms?
Any attempt to classify the Forms, or, more accurately, any attempt to sort through 
the variety of constructs that are brought under the rubric of Forms, must deal 
with the possibility of negative Forms. The problem, of course, is not with the 
possibility of negative concepts, for these are admittedly legion, but they are 
not Forms. Nor do we need to worry about the possibility of negative Relational 
Forms, because these come in pairs of intrinsically value-neutral correlative ele-
ments standing in a complementary relationship that exhausts, and thereby rep-
resents, basic, or universal, categories. Despite the hierarchical nature of the cor-
relation, the lower, or subordinate, element is not negative, especially not in the 
sense of evil. It is merely at a preferential disadvantage that may be psychological 
or cultural, whereby positive thoughts about the element typically listed first (be-
cause it is preferred) relegate the one listed second to a subordinate complemen-
tary status. All this is consistent with Plato's two-level vision of the universe. This 
just leaves Ideal Forms and (secondarily) the Conceptual Forms associated with 
them, and this is precisely where the problem would be if any negative Forms 
were to be discovered in their midst. Ideal Forms are, by our definition, oriented 
toward that which is good and desirable, and anything to diminish their goodness 
and desirability would overturn our classification.
Indeed, a few menacing examples of apparently negative Ideal Forms stand 
out. The critical reader may benefit from contemplating the most salient passages.
The most conspicuous case is the beginning of Socrates' elenchus in the 
Euthyphro (5c–6e), where he tries to elicit from Euthyphron a definition of piety. 
In contrast to other definitional dialogues, we find here a logically superfluous yet 
dramatically essential emphasis on the opposite of the concept sought, namely, 
the unholy (to asebes, to anhosion), which is provided with markers suggesting 
an Ideal Form (pointed auto, idea, eidos, cf. 15d). Plato must have been teasing 
his audience. Even ancient critics may have noticed the terminological slide: The 
otherwise reliable ms. B reads hosiotēta at Euthyphro 5d4, perhaps as a reflection 
63  For a more genuinely Platonic background, see the Timaeus (48a) and the Sophist (268c–
275c). For why the Laws might not be so genuinely Platonic, see Nails and Thesleff (2003, 
14–29).
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of an attempt to refer the entire sentence to to hosion, not to to anhosion. But note 
the play with refined terminology (for instance, 7c, 9d, 11a, 12c, 13e, 14c). The 
dialogue is certainly not 'very early', as many modern critics have assumed.64 It 
is unthinkable that Plato would have believed in an Ideal Form for to anhosion. 
He seems even to have been in some doubt about to hosion, traditionally included 
among the cardinal virtues, as in Protagoras 329c and Phaedo 75d (with auto). In 
the Republic, it is not a central virtue but part of dikaiosunē (e.g., 4,443a).
Another passage for contemplation comes in the Republic, where Socrates 
asserts that guardians-in-training must learn to recognise the eidē of sōphrosunē, 
andreia, etc., and of their opposites (3,402b–403b, 3,409b, cf. 5,476a). What is 
meant here must be the manifestations of such qualities, not the qualities existing 
in and of themselves as Ideal Forms. The eidē and the opposites in question are 
just concepts, dispositions, or behaviour patterns. The megista mathēmata, which 
include Ideal Forms, come later (6,503e, 6,504a).
The Phaedo, to expand on what has already been said about it above (sec-
tion 8), is one of the most tempting places to look for a negative Ideal Form. The 
dialogue appears to bring together everything we have here distinguished as this 
or that type of abstraction, which, upon close inspection, may or may not call for 
designation as a Form of any kind. And the temptation to look there is intensified 
by its preoccupation with opposition, repeatedly contrasting one concept with 
another.
For all that, negative Ideal Forms are nowhere to be found in the dialogue. 
An introductory section on Forms mentions only Ideal Forms (65d–68d). The first 
argument on immortality (70c–72e) is concerned with opposition on the level of 
physical reactions and particulars rather than Forms. The second argument (72e–
77a), from recollection, does not operate primarily with opposition. The third 
argument (78b–80b), commonly known as the analogic argument, proceeds with 
pairs of relational universal concepts: noncomposite and composite; constant and 
changing; invisible and visible; soul and body; and so on. This leaves the final ar-
64  Critics assigning such an early date to the Euthyphro are too numerous to acknowledge 
with full publication details. To cite just one example, Ledger (1989) places the dialogue in 
second place overall, preceded only by the Lysis (comprehensive list in 224–25, cf. 229). For 
further examples, see Thesleff (1982, 8–17 [= 2009, 154–63]), who provides a conspectus of 
chronologies cataloguing 132 attempts at establishing the production sequence of the Platonic 
corpus. One of those attempts (1982, 16 [= 2009, 162]) belongs to Thesleff himself, reflecting 
his earlier work (1967), but see Thesleff (1982, 204–05, 223–26 [= 2009, 351–52, 369–71]) for 
his later views specifically on dating the Euthyphro. For related issues in chronology, see n. 4 
above. Cf. also the latter part of n. 10 above.
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gument (105b–107a), where the prime candidate for a negative Ideal Form would 
seem to be death. The well-known conclusion of the argument is that the soul, as 
the bringer of life, does not admit death, as the opposite of life, because, so we 
are told beforehand, the soul's connection with life is an interminable one: Life is 
not simply a phase the soul goes through but an essential property of the soul.65
This is a controversial argument. But what is important for our immediate 
purposes is the nature of an asymmetrical contrast between life and death. The 
text bears out the interpretation of a Form of life (106d), but this does not mean 
that death is to be treated in the same way. Even life is not quite like the typical 
Ideal Form (the just, the beautiful, and so on), and this leaves little room for its 
opposite to ascend to that status.
In the main, the Phaedo tends to approach all Forms from the perspective 
of relational universal concepts. This makes them Relational Forms in the clas-
sification proposed and defended here. The first member of each pair (similarity, 
largeness, hotness, oddness, life) may approximate to Ideal Forms, but the oppo-
site characteristics do not elevate the correlative elements at the lower end to the 
status of Ideal Forms.
The Phaedrus (250a) mentions to adikon, but this cannot be an Ideal Form, 
as it is simply a reference to an unfortunate turn toward unrighteousness in a soul 
that has already failed in its cosmic journey toward the upper regions, where it 
would otherwise aspire to dwell with the gods in the presence of Ideal Forms. 
To adikon is simply a negative concept. The later mention of a single eidos of 
to aphron must likewise be dismissed, coming as it does in the course of a brief 
commentary (265d–266c) on the method of dihaeresis, where the focus is on con-
cepts or Conceptual Forms. This may be confirmed by the extensive dihaereses 
in the Sophist.
The Sophist (246a–247e) presents a parallel case in point, as the Eleatic 
Visitor argues for the noetic and incorporeal eidē constituting true ousia, and 
offers as examples (247a–b) the presence of dikaiosunē, phronēsis, etc., and of 
their opposites, in the soul to which they (as primary entities) give their character. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis is on the abstract quality of concepts, not specifically 
on Ideal Forms, though the latter serve as models.
The search for the elusive evil twin of Ideal Forms can go on forever, or at 
least as far as one can continue to identify potential candidates in the text, though 
exhaustive treatment here cannot be a practical goal.66
65  The soul is associated with the upper level, but there is no Ideal Form for it.
66  A set of observations cutting across multiple dialogues may provide additional insight into 
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11. Conclusion
We have been concerned with Platonic Forms. The importance of this issue for 
Plato's own thinking has perhaps been overrated for centuries. But it is part of 
his ontology and epistemology, where intuitive visions and strict reasoning come 
into play with equal vigour, and, often, with equal subtlety.
We submit that the constructs commonly known as Plato's Forms do not 
all belong together. They originate in three separate attempts to explore abstrac-
tion from a philosophical perspective. These are distinct but overlapping efforts, 
all part of a continuous thought experiment geared toward understanding a single 
universe with basically two ontological levels, and modified as needed, either to 
pursue new insights or to rethink old ones. The building blocks of reality emerg-
ing from the separate attempts have come down to us as a massive collection of 
undifferentiated units. And scholars have been content to continue to treat this as 
a homogeneous collection with each element essentially the same as any other. 
Getting out of that habit promises to enrich our understanding of the main lines 
of Plato's thought.
The revision required is to identify the proper divisions in the heretofore 
fungible Forms. Our classification recognises three such divisions:
• Ideal Forms: noetic realities with superlative intrinsic value, especially mor-
al value, but also aesthetic and religious value.
• Conceptual Forms: universals to which Plato assigns objective reality, but 
not intrinsic value, though positive and negative connotations occur, and 
ontological ascent is possible through approximation to Ideal Forms.
• Relational Forms: correlative pairs of relational universal concepts em-
ployed in the pursuit of a structural understanding of the cosmos, the first 
element of each pair being capable of ontological ascent, much like the case 
of Conceptual Forms.
the question of negative Forms. One such wide-ranging theme is the contrast between pleas-
ure and pain. Pleasure is not, on the whole, regarded very highly by Plato. The most graphic 
reminder of this is the legendary chariot's unruly horse (Phaedrus 253c–254e), chastised re-
peatedly for seeking pleasure (cf. Phaedo 69b, 83b, and passim; Timaeus 69c–d). Occasion-
ally, however, we find hints of the possibility of an Ideal Form for pleasure. In the Protagoras 
(351d–357e), Socrates argues that the art of metrētikē is a condition for reaching the good in 
pleasure (hēdonē autē 351d; cf. Statesman 283d; Philebus 55e). In the Republic (9,586b), true 
and pure pleasure is placed within reach of the wise. In the Philebus, true pleasure is ranked 
high throughout the dialogue, though the discussion only peripherally touches on Forms. Even 
if there is an Ideal Form for pleasure, a negative Ideal Form for pain, or for any other evil, is 
not to be found anywhere in the corpus.
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Although these are not actually three different kinds of Forms, retaining that des-
ignation is convenient for the continuity of discussion. Otherwise, Ideal Forms 
are the real thing, the other two being glorified concepts far short of the perfection 
associated with noetic reality. They can indeed take on some of the features of 
Ideal Forms, but not as a rule, and never the attribute of positive intrinsic value.
Hence, while the difference between a concept and a Conceptual Form is 
significant, at least in terms of the second-order language we use in trying to fig-
ure out what Plato is doing, the same thing can sometimes be treated as a concept 
and sometimes as a Conceptual Form. Plato can move in a flash from hot thing to 
hotness to the hot itself, and it is not always easy to see which sense is in the fore-
front, but it is easy to see that there are differences. The same holds for Relational 
Forms, particularly for the dominant element in each pairing.
We believe we have made a reasonable appeal for this classification. Natu-
rally, there will be reservations and objections, especially since our proposal, 
in essence, limits Forms proper to Ideal Forms. Their cognates among Con-
ceptual Forms and Relational Forms reflect only some of their characteristics. 
The strength of our thesis is best reflected in a famous vision: the imagery of 
what awaits the soul of the philosopher upon the completion of its cosmic ascent 
(Phaedrus 248a–249d). When the enlightened soul joins the gods in admiration 
of the Forms, it will behold justice, temperance, knowledge, and such (247d), not 
horseness or wetness or muckness. Plato's poetry is all about the Ideal Forms, 
transcendent and intelligible and immutable and altogether precious, all culmi-
nating in the Good. Among mortals, philosophers alone are able to attain them.
This is not to deny a place to Plato's first principles, the one and the indefi-
nite dyad, but these seem to have been a late pythagorising experiment built on 
the two-level model, and we do not know enough about them to incorporate them 
as essential ingredients in a working model of Plato's overall vision. As for nega-
tive Ideal Forms, Plato makes no room for them, denying negative concepts the 
possibility of ascent to the noetic level, which is inherently opposed to negativity.
We further contend that our reconstruction of the conceptual apparatus 
Plato uses to make sense of the world has a distinct advantage in bringing out the 
axiological orientation of his worldview. This is an area where the simple con-
trast between Forms and particulars falls short. That black-and-white contrast, 
in turn, is a legacy and shortcoming of the traditional interpretation of Plato as a 
thoroughgoing metaphysical dualist. The ultimate solution, therefore, is to aban-
don the dualism of two worlds in favour of the asymmetrical and complementary 
hierarchy of two levels, providing all the room necessary for the stratification 
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of reality in correspondence with what we get from the text, without the typical 
problems we run into with the traditional interpretation.
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